We upheld the FMLA as a valid exercise of Congress’ §5 power to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination, even though there was no suggestion that the State’s leave policy was adopted or applied with a discriminatory purpose that would render it unconstitutional. ... We approved the family-care leave provision of the FMLA as valid §5 legislation based primarily on evidence of disparate provision of parenting leave, little of which concerned unconstitutional state conduct. ...
Now Rehnquist asserts that "the FMLA was 'narrowly targeted' to remedy widespread gender discrimination in the availability of family leave," but little if any of that gender discrimination amounted to a violation of a constitutional right (as the right against sex discrimination is delineated in the case law). Before Hibbs, it wasn't enough that there was a serious social problem that Congress had undertaken to remedy: it had to have a remedy framed as a cure for the violation of a constitutional right. The Chief Justice tried then and now to portray Hibbs as preserving the §5 test applied in the Court's earlier cases, but it didn't, as Justice Kennedy amply demonstrated in Hibbs. Since Rehnquist's own opinion in Hibbs took the bite out of the §5 doctrine, he has no basis to complain about what the majority did today, which was to see what really happened in Hibbs.
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